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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 15-3742 
_____________ 
 
NORTHEAST REVENUE SERVICES, LLC, 
       Appellant 
                       
v. 
 
MAPS INDEED, INC; VICTOR DEANTHONY, JAMES FILLA, 
JEFFERY DEANTHONY, INSEQUENCE, INC. 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the  
Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 3-14-cv-00852) 
District Judge:  Hon. Edwin M. Kosik 
_____________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
April 7, 2017 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, SCIRICA, and FISHER Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: April 12, 2017)                    
_____________ 
 
OPINION  
_____________ 
                                                          
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
 The plaintiff, Northeast Revenue Services LLC (“Northeast Revenue”), brought 
this suit alleging violation of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a 
et seq. (the “Securities Exchange Act”); the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, et seq. (“RICO”); and various state laws.  The 
District Court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss.  For the reasons set forth 
below, we will affirm the order of the District Court.1  
I. 
 Because we write exclusively for the parties, we set forth only those facts 
necessary to our disposition.  The facts, as alleged in the Amended Complaint, are as 
follows.  Northeast Revenue is a Pennsylvania limited liability company.  Maps Indeed, 
Inc. (“Maps Indeed”) is a registered Virginia corporation.  Victor DeAnthony was the 
president and CEO of Maps Indeed and was “an employee, agent, representative, or 
principal” of Insequence, Inc. (“Insequence”).  Appendix (“App.”) 38 ¶ 6.  Jeffrey 
DeAnthony was the chief marketing officer of Maps Indeed and was also “an employee, 
agent, representative, or principal” of Insequence.  App. 38 ¶ 7.2  Insequence is a 
Missouri corporation with the same registered office address as Maps Indeed.  
Insequence “was/is the parent company, controlling shareholder in, and alter ego of 
                                                          
1 The District Court granted James Filla’s motion to dismiss on April 30, 2015, and that 
order is not at issue in this appeal.  
2 James Filla is/was the chief technology officer and a director and principal at Maps 
Indeed.  He is also the president and CEO of Insequence.  Filla and the DeAnthonys are 
referred to collectively in the Amended Complaint as the “Individual Defendants.”   
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Defendant Maps Indeed, Inc.”  App. 38 ¶ 8.  Northeast Revenue argues that whereas 
Maps Indeed was purported “to be a technology company using global satellite imagery 
to provide a service allowing its clients to access and share geospatial and property data 
(e.g., property assessment values and municipal tax liabilities) in real time and online,”  
App. 43 ¶ 23, in reality, it was a “phony subsidiary and/or affiliate company,” App. 39 ¶ 
13, of Insequence that was “used partially as a corporate shell to collect money from 
unsuspecting investors.” App. 43 ¶ 24.  
 In 2012, the Individual Defendants approached Northeast Revenue about entering 
into a contract.  The terms of the contract were negotiated in Pennsylvania, and the 
contract was executed there as well.  According to Northeast Revenue, the Individual 
Defendants made several misrepresentations to it, thereby fraudulently inducing 
Northeast Revenue to enter into the contract.  Northeast Revenue alleges that the 
defendants “manufactured and furnished Plaintiff with purportedly accurate financial 
statements and financial projections (‘pro formas’) that were designed to induce Plaintiff 
to enter into the agreement, and to pay Defendants specified sums of money pursuant to 
same.”  App. 46 ¶ 36.  Northeast Revenue also alleges that the DeAnthonys “personally 
extended oral warranties to Plaintiff regarding the viability of the products, services, and 
investment opportunity contemplated under the agreement.”  App. 46 ¶ 40, 41.  Northeast 
Revenue entered into an agreement with Maps Indeed, executed by Victor DeAnthony on 
its behalf in his capacity as president.  Under the terms of the contract, Northeast 
Revenue was required to pay a total of $150,000.00 to Maps Indeed and to “market Maps 
Indeed, Inc.[’s] proprietary software to Counties and Municipalities in the 
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Commonwealth of Pennsylvania” and to “assist Maps Indeed, Inc. with the setup and 
maintenance of its geospatial information system.”  App. 114.  In exchange, Maps Indeed 
would provide “products, services, and investment return.”  App. 47 ¶ 45.  Northeast 
completed its payments and “Defendants failed to perform at all and provided none of the 
agreed upon products, support, and/or services to Plaintiff.”  App. 47 ¶ 47. 
 Northeast Revenue alleges that it was not the defendants’ only victim.  It alleges 
that at least three other Pennsylvania citizens were also induced into entering contracts 
with the defendants.  Northeast Revenue alleges that among the misrepresentations 
conveyed to the other victims were the following:  
(a) untrue statements about former Pennsylvania Governor Thomas Ridge’s 
involvement as a director of Defendant Maps Indeed, Inc., (b) founding 
shareholder of America Online, Inc. (“AOL”) also serving as a director of 
Maps Indeed, Inc., (c) the imminent acquisition of Defendant Maps Indeed, 
Inc. by LexisNexis Group, Inc. or Xerox Corporation Ltd., and (d) 
Individual Defendants’ issuance of several artificial and altered statements 
of financial projection(s). 
 
App. 41 ¶ 18.  The defendants also represented that Maps Indeed’s “core technology was 
originally developed for the Department of Defense . . . [and] [t]he success within [t]he 
Department of Defense prompted the continued development to allow full technology 
integration within all levels of government.”  App. 44 ¶ 28 (quoting App. 104).  In total, 
the other victims lost at least $380,000.00 in investments in Maps Indeed.   
 Insequence filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction 
and for failure to state a claim.  Maps Indeed and Victor DeAnthony filed a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim and for a more definite statement.  Jeffrey DeAnthony 
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  The District Court concluded that 
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although there was personal jurisdiction over Insequence, Northeast Revenue failed to 
state a claim under federal law against any of the defendants and declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.  The District Court did not grant 
Northeast Revenue leave to amend its complaint.  Northeast Revenue timely appealed.   
II.3 
 On appeal, Northeast Revenue argues that the District Court erred by concluding 
that it had not adequately alleged securities fraud, a RICO violation, and a RICO 
conspiracy.  It also argues that the District Court abused its discretion by failing to 
provide an opportunity sua sponte to amend the complaint.4  
A. 
 Count One alleges securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act and SEC Rule 10b-5.  Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act includes an implied 
cause of action.  See Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 
1184, 1207 (2013).  “The elements of an implied § 10(b) cause of action for securities 
fraud are ‘(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) 
                                                          
3 The District Court had jurisdiction over federal law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 
and supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
4 We exercise plenary review over an order granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Simon v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 732 F.3d 259, 
264 (3d Cir. 2013).  “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, 
accepting the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true and viewing them in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court concludes that those allegations ‘could not 
raise a claim of entitlement to relief.’”  Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 558 (2007)).  “We review a district court decision refusing leave to amend under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) for abuse of discretion.”  Great W. Mining & 
Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a 
security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) 
loss causation.’”  Id. (quoting Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 37–38 
(2011)).  The District Court concluded that Northeast Revenue failed to state a claim for 
violation of the Securities Exchange Act because Northeast Revenue did not purchase a 
“security,” as defined by the statute.   
 The statutory definition of “security” includes “several catch-all categories which 
were designed to cover other securities interests not specifically enumerated in the 
statute.”  Steinhardt Grp. Inc. v. Citicorp, 126 F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir. 1997) (interpreting 
15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) with a substantially similar definition of “security”).  Northeast 
Revenue argues that its contract falls into one of these categories as an “investment 
contract.”  An investment contract is “a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person 
invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the 
efforts of the promoter or a third party . . . .”  S.E.C. v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 
298–99 (1946).  “Thus, the three requirements for establishing an investment contract 
are: (1) ‘an investment of money,’ (2) ‘in a common enterprise,’ (3) ‘with profits to come 
solely from the efforts of others.’”  Steinhardt, 126 F.3d at 151 (quoting Howey, 328 U.S. 
at 301).  The parties do not dispute that the first two elements of the Howey test are 
satisfied but contest whether the third element is satisfied.  The question we must answer 
is whether Northeast Revenue’s profits were to come solely from the effort of others. 
 The third element of the Howey test “requires that the purchaser be attracted to the 
investment by the prospect of a profit on the investment rather than a desire to use or 
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consume the item purchased.”  Steinhardt, 126 F.3d at 152.  Courts look at “whether the 
investor has meaningfully participated in the management of the partnership in which it 
has invested such that it has more than minimal control over the investment’s 
performance.”  Id.  We consider “the transaction as a whole, considering the 
arrangements the parties made for the operation of the investment vehicle in order to 
determine who exercised control in generating profits for the vehicle.”  Id. at 153 
(footnote omitted).  Importantly, the definition of an investment contract “embodies a 
flexible rather than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the 
countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others 
on the promise of profits.”  S.E.C. v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 393 (2004) (quoting 
Howey, 328 U.S. at 299).  Accordingly, we have held that “an investment contract can 
exist where the investor is required to perform some duties, as long as they are nominal 
or limited and would have ‘little direct effect upon receipt by the participant of the 
benefits promised by the promoters.’”  Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689, 692 (3d 
Cir. 1973) (quoting Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Release Notice, Release No. 5211 (Nov. 30, 
1971)).  In Lino, for example, we concluded that the franchise license agreements at issue 
were not investment contracts because they required the licensee to make “significant 
efforts”; he was required to “open a sales center, staff it, and devote full time and best 
efforts to his business,” as well as “recruit [and train] area distributors.”  Id. at 693.   
 The District Court here concluded that “[Northeast Revenue] was required to 
make ‘significant efforts’ under the Agreement, as the benefits promised by the 
Agreement, were based directly on [Northeast Revenue’s] duties.”  App. 14.  In 
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particular, Northeast revenue was required to “market [Maps Indeed’s] proprietary 
software to Counties and Municipalities in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania” and 
“assist [Maps Indeed] with the setup and maintenance of its geospatial information 
system.”  App. 14–15.  Northeast Revenue argues that the “‘essential managerial efforts 
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise’ all fall squarely on Maps Indeed.”  
Northeast Revenue Br. 17 (quoting Lino, 487 F.2d at 692).  In particular, Maps Indeed 
was responsible for “providing, hosting and maintaining the geospatial information 
system.”  Id. 
 Although Northeast Revenue accurately states Maps Indeed’s obligations under 
the contract, it minimizes its own obligations.  The beginning of the contract is 
particularly illustrative in demonstrating the cooperative relationship between Northeast 
Revenue and Maps Indeed.  It provides, in pertinent part, 
WHEREAS, Maps Indeed, Inc. is a technology company which 
provides services to County and State Governments to share and sell data 
online; 
WHEREAS, Northeast Revenue Services, LLC provides services to 
County and Municipal Governments; 
WHEREAS, Maps Indeed, Inc. has developed a geospatial 
information system which provides online access to geo-reference and non-
geo-reference information in an online interface; 
 WHEREAS, Northeast Revenue Service, LLC has developed unique 
expertise and experience with marketing its products to Counties within the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; 
 WHEREAS, Maps Indeed, Inc. desires assistance with marketing its 
geospatial information system to customers of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania from Northeast Revenue, LLC; 
 WHEREAS, the parties have reached an agreement whereby 
Northeast Revenue Service, LLC shall be granted exclusive licensing for 
Maps Indeed, Inc. within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania . . . . 
 
App. 113.  The contract then describes the aforementioned obligations of each party.   
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 This is not a contract in which the plaintiff’s duties are “nominal or limited and 
would have ‘little direct effect upon receipt by the participant of the benefits promised by 
the promoters.’”  Lino, 487 F.2d at 692 (quoting Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Release Notice, 
Release No. 5211 (Nov. 30, 1971)).  Rather, the success of Maps Indeed and the profits 
to be derived by Northeast Revenue are, in part, dependent on Northeast Revenue’s 
networking, expertise and marketing efforts, as well as its efforts to “setup and 
maint[ain]” the Maps Indeed system in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  App. 114. 
Therefore, we conclude that the contract between Northeast Revenue and the defendants 
is not an investment contract and that Northeast Revenue failed to state a claim for 
securities fraud.  
B. 
 Count Two alleges violation of RICO, and Count Three alleges conspiracy to 
violate RICO.  “To plead a RICO claim under § 1962(c), ‘the plaintiff must allege (1) 
conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.’”  In re Ins. 
Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 362 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Lum v. Bank of 
Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2004), abrogated in part on other grounds by Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)).  To plead a pattern of racketeering 
activity, a plaintiff must allege “at least two acts of racketeering activity within a ten-year 
period.”  Id. at 363 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5)).  Northeast Revenue alleges predicate 
acts of “bank fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud.”  App. 51 ¶ 70.  Although bank fraud, 
mail fraud, and wire fraud may serve as predicate acts to support a RICO claim, see 18 
U.S.C. § 1961(1) and Lum, 361 F.3d at 223, the District Court concluded that Northeast 
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Revenue failed to meet the appropriate pleading standard.  
 Where, as here, the plaintiff relies on bank fraud,5 mail fraud, and wire fraud6 as 
the basis for a RICO violation, it must pled with specificity as required by Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 9(b).  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b); Lum, 361 F.3d at 223.  Rule 9(b) 
requires that a plaintiff “state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or 
mistake.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).  We have held that “[p]laintiffs may satisfy this 
requirement by pleading the ‘date, place or time’ of the fraud, or through ‘alternative 
means of injecting precision and some measure of substantiation into their allegations of 
fraud.’”  Lum, 361 F.3d at 224 (quoting Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. 
Corp., 742 F.2d 786, 791 (3d Cir. 1984)).  A plaintiff “also must allege who made a 
misrepresentation to whom and the general content of the misrepresentation.”  Id.  
 Northeast Revenue alleges that the defendants used “a means and instrumentality 
of interstate commerce and the mails and phone lines . . . in connection with the sale of 
securities in Defendant Maps Indeed, Inc. . . . to defraud Plaintiff . . . .”  App. 50 ¶ 58.  It 
also alleges that “[t]he course of conduct displayed by Defendants necessarily consisted 
of instances of bank fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud . . . in efforts to further the schemes 
of the enterprise.” App. 51 ¶ 70.  These allegations lack the specificity required to satisfy 
                                                          
5 The federal bank fraud statute prohibits the knowing execution or attempted execution 
of a scheme or artifice “(1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to obtain any of the 
moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or under the 
custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, 
representations, or promises.”  18 U.S.C. § 1344. 
6 “The federal mail and wire fraud statutes prohibit the use of the mail or interstate wires 
for purposes of carrying out any scheme or artifice to defraud.”  Lum, 361 F.3d at 223 
(citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 (mail fraud) and 1343 (wire fraud)). 
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Rule 9(b) because they lack precision and some measure of substantiation.  Northeast 
Revenue attempts to provide substantiation by arguing that its reference to “pro formas” 
and its inclusion of a “false investment presentation” attached as an exhibit to the 
Amended Complaint further support its claim.  However, there is no indication that the 
mail or wires were involved in producing or transmitting these documents.  Likewise, 
there is no indication that these documents could support a claim of bank fraud.  
 Because Northeast Revenue’s substantive RICO claim fails as a matter of law, it 
follows that its conspiracy claim also fails.  Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 
1153, 1191 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Any claim under section 1962(d) based on a conspiracy to 
violate the other subsections of section 1962 necessarily must fail if the substantive 
claims are themselves deficient.”).  Accordingly, the District Court did not err in granting 
the motion to dismiss the complaint.7 
C. 
 Finally, Northeast Revenue argues that the District Court erred by failing to grant 
leave to amend the complaint.  In Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 
Inc., we held that “in ordinary civil litigation it is hardly error for a district court to enter 
final judgment after granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss when the plaintiff has not 
properly requested leave to amend its complaint.”  482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007).  
Northeast Revenue did not request leave to amend in the District Court, so the District 
                                                          
7 Northeast Revenue does not challenge the District Court’s decision to decline to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over its state law claims.  In any event, we note that 
because the District Court properly dismissed Northeast Revenue’s federal claims, the 
District Court acted within its discretion when it declined to exercise jurisdiction over its 
state law claims.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).   
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Court did not abuse its discretion by failing to grant leave sua sponte.  Northeast Revenue 
argues that our holding in Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008) is 
contrary to that in Fletcher-Harlee.  In Phillips, we stated that “if a complaint is subject to 
a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, a district court must permit a curative amendment unless such 
an amendment would be inequitable or futile.”  515 F.3d at 245.  However, Phillips was a 
civil rights case, and we have consistently held that “in civil rights cases district courts 
must offer amendment—irrespective of whether it is requested—when dismissing a case 
for failure to state a claim unless doing so would be inequitable or futile.”  Fletcher-
Harlee, 482 F.3d at 251.  Because this is not a civil rights case, the District Court was not 
required to sua sponte offer amendment.8   
IV. 
 For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the order of the District Court.  
                                                          
8 Northeast Revenue points to two non-precedential opinions in which we acknowledged 
“an apparent conflict” between Fletcher-Harlee and Phillips.  Northeast Revenue Br. 24 
n. 3 (quoting Snyder v. Baxter Healthcare, Inc., 393 F. App’x 905, 910 (3d Cir. 2010)); 
see also Snyder, 393 F. App’x at 909–10 (“In Phillips, a Section 1983 case, we 
announced that ‘[i]f a complaint is vulnerable to 12(b)(6), a district court must permit a 
curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or futile.’ The reach of 
this rule outside of the Section 1983 context, and extent to which a district court must sua 
sponte offer leave to amend remains unresolved.” (citation omitted) (quoting Phillips, 
515 F.3d at 236)); Guirguis v. Movers Specialty Servs., Inc., 346 F. App’x 774, 777 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (“The interaction between Phillips and Fletcher-Harlee Corp. presents an 
interesting question but one that we need not resolve on this appeal.”).  Although our 
statement was broad in Phillips, it nonetheless was a civil rights case and the holding of 
Fletcher-Harlee remains intact, as does our distinction between ordinary civil cases and 
civil rights case.  
 
